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Drawing on the conceptual framework of implicit-explicit corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”), this paper distinguishes governmental/regulatory force and 
market/societal force as the two main determinants of CSR and argues that 
governmental/regulatory force is the dominant driver for implicit mandatory CSR while 
market/societal force is the dominant driver for explicit voluntary CSR. By using China, the 
world’s second largest economy, as an example, this paper examines how 
governmental/regulatory force shape a country’s CSR system, as opposed to market/societal 
force. Moreover, due to the rise of corporations’ explicit CSR activities and shrinking of 
implicit mandatory CSR rules in the West, this paper also endeavors to find out whether 
implicit practices of business responsibility in China will transform into explicit CSR activities. 
After looking into the tradition, current momentum, and the inadequacy of conventional 
business case reasoning in China, this paper concludes that despite the increasing role of 
market/societal force in advancing CSR, governmental/regulatory force remains the dominant 
driver for CSR development in China, which, in turn, implies more governmental intervention 
and regulations defining minimum standards of corporate behavior. This paper also discusses 
different functions that the Chinese government can potentially take in further shaping and 
promoting CSR. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The popularity of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) has spread onto the world 
scene.1   However, corporations in different societies may express and pursue their social 
responsibilities differently. There are some basic institutional prerequisites for CSR, such as 
function of market, function of government and legal institutions, which is why meanings and 
practices of CSR in different countries constitute part of the research question in this area.2  
In China over past decades, increased social violations and environmental degradation 
are side effects of fast economic development.3 Problems such as water scarcity and quality, 
industrial pollution, labor conditions, product safety, corruption and income inequality among 
many others are alarming.4 With a unique background and increasingly significant role in 
global affairs, China’s CSR development is worth more attention and thorough examination.  
Although CSR is becoming a growing management issue in this world’s second largest 
economy, most Chinese domestic researchers focus on the correlation between engaging in 
CSR activities and corporate financial performance.5 In order to fill the literature gap and 
identify the underlying determinant of CSR in the context of China, this paper will draw on the 
implicit-explicit CSR framework developed by Matten and Moon6 in order to examine CSR 
and the trend in China from an institutional and regulatory perspective. 
According to Matten and Moon, implicit CSR consists of “values, norms, and rules that 
result in (mandatory and customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder 
issues and that define proper obligations of corporate actors.”7 Similarly, Young and Marias 
argued that implicit CSR normally includes those policies and practices that are regarded as 
“minimum standards” and “regulated.”8 In contrast, Matten and Moon argued that explicit CSR 
consists of “voluntary programs and strategies by corporations,”9 which is seen as voluntary in 
nature.10 That is also why Jamali and Neville gauged explicit CSR through “the explicit 
 
1 Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of 
Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 86 (2010). 
2  Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, Implicit and Explicit CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative 
Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 405 (2008). 
3 See, e.g., Shunsuke Managi & Shinji Kaneko, Economic Growth and the Environment in China: An empirical 
analysis of productivity, 6 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 89, 125 (2006); Richard Wike & Stefan 
Cornibert, Corruption, Pollution, Inequality are Top Concerns in China: Many Worry about Threats to Traditions 
and Culture, Pew Research Center (September 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/09/24/corruption-pollution-inequality-are-top-concerns-in-china/. 
4 Id.; see also Mehran Idris Khan & Yen-Chiang Chang, Environmental Challenges and Current Practices in 
China—A Thorough Analysis, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 2547 (2018); Ting Ma et. al., Pollution exacerbates China’s 
water scarcity and its regional inequality, 11 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 650 (2020), doi:10.1038/s41467-020-
14532-5. 
5 See Zheng Li, A Study on Relation of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Value: Empirical Evidence 
from Shanghai Securities Exchange, 2 CHINA INDUS. ECON. 77–83 (2006); Peiyuan Guo & Yongda Yu, The 
Performance of Social Responsibilities by Means of the Cooperation Between Public and Private Enterprises – 
A Case Study of Programs of Supporting the Poor in China’s Causes of “Helping to Start an Undertaking”, 4 
MGMT. WORLD 41–47 (2006); Yanfeng Zhou et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Behavior and Consumer 
Responses: The Moderator Effects of Consumer Personal Characteristic and Price Signal, 3 CHINA INDUS. ECON. 
62–69 (2007); Zhilong Tian et al., Consumer Responses to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China, 101 
J. BUS. ETHICS 197–212 (2011); Juelin Yin & Yuli Zhang, Institutional Dynamics and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in an Emerging Country Context: Evidence from China, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS 301–16 (2012); 
Junnan Hu et al., Environmental Responsibility, Market Valuation, and Firm Characteristics: Evidence from 
China, 25 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 1376–87 (2018).  
6 Matten & Moon, supra note 2. 
7 Id. at 410.  
8 Suzanne Young & Magalie Marias, A Multi-level Perspective of CSR Reporting: The Implications of National 
Institutions and Industry Risk Characteristics, 20 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 432, 440 (2012). 
9 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 410. 
10 Young & Magalie, supra note 8, at 434. 
voluntary deliberate design of CSR, the explicit deployment of CSR agendas, vocabulary, 
policies and programs in the organization.”11  
Matten and Moon suggested countries with strict regulatory regimes are more likely to 
bind corporate behavior in a mandatory manner and implicitly direct corporations to address 
society’s interests and concerns, while countries with less strict regulatory regimes allow 
corporations to design their own discretionary CSR programs and policies explicitly to respond 
to stakeholder pressures.12  
Based on the conceptual framework of implicit-explicit CSR, this paper distinguishes 
and discusses governmental/regulatory force and market/societal force as the two main 
determinants of CSR and argues governmental/regulatory force is the dominant driver for 
implicit mandatory CSR while the market/societal force is the dominant driver for explicit 
voluntary CSR. In China for example, the institutional environment and the dominant role 
played by governmental/regulatory forces determine its implicit and mandatory CSR system.  
Meanwhile, due to the rise of corporations’ explicit CSR activities and shrinking of 
implicit mandatory CSR rules in the West, it is also interesting to see whether implicit practice 
of business responsibility in China would transform into explicit CSR activities. Despite the 
fact that both governmental/regulatory force and market/societal force are increasing in China, 
this paper finds that the strong political will and the comparatively weak market/societal force 
determine that the implicit mandatory CSR is essential and will likely remain the norm in the 
foreseeable future in China, which indicates more regulations either defining minimum 
obligations or mandating more socially responsible behavior. Having said that, the unique 
situations in China make it potentially possible for corporations to engage in explicit voluntary 
CSR activities and at the same time meet governmental/regulatory requirements. In particular, 
considering the institutional limits of governmental and regulatory power, this paper calls for 
Chinese government and regulators, using their role of facilitation, partnership and 
endorsement, to provide corporations some rooms for corporations’ discretion and play some 
other key roles in advancing CSR such as endorsement and facilitation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the explicit 
voluntary CSR and implicit mandatory CSR as the nature of CSR. Then Section III 
distinguishes the governmental/regulatory force from market/societal force as the determinants 
of CSR. Section IV uses these two forces to analyze how CSR is shaped in China and the 
underlying rationales. After that, Section V discusses, in detail, the question “will implicit 
practice of business responsibility transform into explicit CSR activities in China?” Section VI 
continues to discuss the dominance of implicit mandatory CSR in China and its development, 
but also explores the multiple roles the Chinese government can play after acknowledging the 
limitation of governmental/regulatory force. Concluding remarks with recommendations are 
provided in Section VII. 
 
II. NATURE OF CSR 
CSR is traditionally seen as a voluntary action taken by businesses. For example, the 
U.K. Government defines CSR as “the voluntary actions that companies can take to address 
both its own competitive interests and the interests of wider society beyond the minimum legal 
obligations.”13 Similarly, in academia, CSR is predominantly referred as voluntary corporate 
commitment to exceed the explicit and implicit obligation imposed on a company by society’s 
expectations of conventional corporate behavior through discretionary business practices and 
 
11 Dima Jamali & Ben Neville, Convergence Versus Divergence of CSR in Developing Countries: An Embedded 
Multi-layered Institutional Lens, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 599, 608 (2011). 
12 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 409. 
13  THE U.K. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENTERPRISE AND REGULATORY REFORM (BERR), CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 5 (2008). 
contributions of corporate resources.14 An analysis of the 37 most used definitions of CSR also 
shows that voluntary is one of the most common dimensions.15  Such voluntary nature is 
predominant in the contemporary CSR literature, which implies corporations’ initiatives and 
governments’ minimal role in advancing CSR.16 
Even Carroll who argued economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic components 
constitute the pyramid of CSR,17 would likely agree with the underlying voluntary nature of 
CSR. He admitted “the essence of CSR and what it really refers to are the ethical and 
philanthropic obligations of the corporation towards society” beyond its economic and legal 
responsibilities. 18  Put simply, CSR refers to obligations “identified as ethical and 
discretionary/philanthropic responsivities” which are essentially “voluntary actions to promote 
and purse social goods.”19 
While CSR has long been defined as voluntary initiatives by private actors and 
policymakers, governments indeed do and can play a vital role in supporting and driving CSR 
by shaping the regulatory environment among others.20 Therefore, the non-voluntary aspect of 
CSR cannot be overlooked. The non-voluntary aspect can be reflected by (a) mandatory CSR 
laws to directly promote socially responsible behavior; (b) mandatory laws defining the 
minimum obligations for deterring socially irresponsible behavior, and/or (c) mandatory 
disclosure of CSR-related issues to indirectly nudge corporations to be more socially 
responsible.21 For non-voluntary or mandatory CSR, corporations normally have no or limited 
discretion in choosing whether or not to do it, because articulating and/or practicing CSR is 
largely equated to fulfil the mandatory requirements.22 Matten and Moon categorized such 
mandatory CSR as implicit on the ground that the decision of engaging CSR is mainly a 
reaction to, and a reflection of, a corporation’s extrinsic institutional environment rather than 
a deliberate and voluntary corporate decision.23 
Accordingly, apart from the voluntary and explicit CSR as conventionally understood, 
CSR can also be mandatory and implicit. These two different types of CSR represent two 
different systems that normally sit on the two ends of the spectrum. It is argued that coordinated 
market economies associated with a strict regulatory regime are more likely to have implicit 
mandatory CSR, while liberal market and less regulated economies tend to have explicit 
 
14 See, e.g., PHILLIP KOTLER & NANCY LEE, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: DOING THE MOST GOOD FOR 
YOUR COMPANY AND YOUR CAUSE (2005); see also Oliver Falck & Stephan Heblich, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good, 50 BUS. HORIZONS 247, 247 (2007). 
15 Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 Definitions, 15 CORP. 
SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 1, 5 (2008). 
16 Nikolay A. Dentchev et al., On Voluntarism and the Role of Governments in CSR: Towards a Contingency 
Approach, 24 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. 378, 378–97 (2015). 
17 Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
497, 497–505 (1979); Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral 
Management of Organizational Stakeholders, 34 BUS. HORIZONS 39, 39–48 (1991).   
18 Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of 
Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 90 (2010). 
19 Id. at 95. 
20 See SUSAN A. AARONSON & JAMES T. REEVES, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: THE 
ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY (National Policy Association 2002); Laura Albareda, Josep M. Lozano & Tamyko Ysa, 
Public Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Governments in Europe, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 
404. 
21 Min Yan, Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Shareholder Value Maximization: Through the Lens of Hard and 
Soft Law, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 47, 70–78 (2019).  
22 For example, after the promulgation of India’s Companies Act 2013, contributing a fraction of profits to CSR 
activities becomes a legal obligation for large companies in India. Companies have little discretion in choosing to 
do it or not. Id. at 70-71.  
23 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 410. 
voluntary CSR.24 When existing institutional and regulatory frameworks provide mandatory 
CSR requirement addressing underlying social and economic concerns—for example 
legislation requiring more labor protection and provision of social benefits—then corporations 
have “almost no need to practice voluntary CSR outside mandatory issues” as their behavior is 
already bound by the strict regulatory regimes.25 Rather, it is mainly about complying with 
laws and norms.26 For example, in Germany, where the existing institutional and regulatory 
environment made the voluntary explicit CSR largely redundant, a Deutschland AG (German 
public limited company) is required not only to pursue corporation’s economic interests but 
also general societal goals.27 Section 70(1) of Aktiengesetz (German Stock Corporation Law) 
in 1937 required management to consider benefit of the enterprises, its employees and the 
common benefit of the people and state.28 Section 76 of Aktiengesetz in 1965 also required 
Deutschland AG to fit in with the economy as a whole and the interest of the general public.29 
That is to say, running a corporation for non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests as well as 
societal interests is mandatorily required. In this context, a corporation belongs to a multitude 
of interested parties, or say stakeholders, and profitability is merely one goal among many 
others.  
Moreover, the German codetermination laws in 1951, 1952 and 1976 established board-
level employee participation, which allows for cooperative agreements and flexible relations 
between management and labor. 30  It further strengthened the stakeholder orientation in 
Germany. In short, the existing institutions were able to effectively bind corporate behavior, 
and there is then not much need for corporations to practice voluntary CSR outside these 
mandatory issues. 
Although corporations could voluntarily make their attachment to CSR and assume 
responsibility for societal interests, many activities that corporations might describe as CSR 
may simply be defined as public policy or regulation, since these activities either receive 
subsidies from public funds or reflect some regulatory requirements. For instance, many 
corporations in China considering CSR should include promoting national/local economic 
development, paying taxes, banning child labor, protecting legitimate staff interests, 
reemploying laid-off employees, and providing jobs for the disabled among others.31 These 
activities largely reflect either public policies or regulatory requirements, and are thereby 
different from the so-called “real” voluntary CSR. 
 
III. DETERMINANTS OF CSR 
When existing institutional or other mandatory requirements bind corporations to 
assume responsibility for some societal interests rather than merely shareholder economic 
interests, it is not difficult to understand the motivation for corporations to engage in CSR 
activities. Put differently, under an implicit CSR system, doing CSR simply means to comply 
with CSR rules and policies set out by governments and legislators. Hence, the governmental 
 
24 Id. at 409–10. 
25 Stefanie Hiss, From Implicit to Explicit Corporate Social Responsibility: Institutional Change as a Fight for 
Myths,19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 433, 436 (2009). 
26 On the other hand, if all corporations could adopt voluntary and explicit CSR, there may be also less necessity 
to have mandatory CSR rules. 
27 See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying texts. 
28 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Law], Jan. 30, 1937, RGBL. I 107, § 70(1) (Ger.). 
29 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Law], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I 1089, § 76 (Ger.). 
30 See Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in the 20th Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205 (Harwell Wells ed. 2018). 
31  Shangkun Xu & Rudai Yang, Indigenous Characteristics of Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility 
Conceptual Paradigm, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 329–30 (2010). 
and regulatory factor is an important determinant of CSR, particularly in coordinated market 
economies like Germany or transitional economies like China. 
Why do corporations assume CSR if it is not compulsory in countries where they 
operate? There must be, of course, a few conscientious businesses willing to do good regardless 
of costs because they see the moral imperatives to be good citizens and do the right thing. For 
most other corporations, however, the determinants of CSR are more extrinsic, such as social 
pressure or market pressure.32 For instance, civil societies, environmental activists, ethical 
consumerism,33 socially responsible investment34 and the like could drive corporations not 
only to pay more attention to CSR but also engage in CSR activities.  
While social pressure is not identical to market pressure, their ultimate impact on 
businesses in terms of the outcome is essentially identical. Market factors such as investors, 
consumers and employees can directly affect the business operation of a corporation and 
thereby its profitability and/or survival. On the other hand, social factors may first affect a 
corporation’s reputation and/or legitimacy, which would, in turn, affect the choices and 
behaviors of investors, consumers and employees, and thereby the profitability and/or survival 
of the corporation. The social pressure on McDonald, Nestle and Nike at the end of last century 
regarding animal rights, infant milk formula and sweat shops in developing countries remain 
very vivid examples.35 As these social pressures can ultimately convert into market pressure in 
one way or another, this paper will categorize market and societal force together in contrast to 
governmental and regulatory force.  
We can therefore see, apart from the so-called moral imperative, 
governmental/regulatory force and market/societal force are the two main determinants of 
CSR. These two different determinants may also explain the two different CSR systems 
discussed above. When governments and regulations play a large role in shaping the 
institutional/regulatory environment driving corporations’ CSR activities in a given 
jurisdiction, it is very likely there is an implicit and mandatory CSR system in place. When a 
country has an implicit and mandatory CSR system, governmental/regulatory force is normally 
the key determinant of corporations’ CSR activities. 36  Typical examples are countries in 
Continental Europe that are characterized as coordinated market economies,37 including the 
foregoing German case where the institutional environment binds corporations to serve wider 
than shareholder interests.38  
On the contrary, when corporations are pressed mainly by market and/or societal 
factors, rather than existing institutions, to engage in CSR activities in a given country, it is 
highly likely that the country’s CSR would be classified as explicit and voluntary. In a country 
with an explicit voluntary CSR system, market and societal force is normally the key 
determinant for corporations’ CSR activities.39 For example, in the U.S., a typical liberal 
market and comparatively less regulated economy where governments neither mandate CSR 
 
32 Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Jyoti Ganapathi, Putting the S Back in Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 848 
(2007). 
33 That is, using selected purchasing behavior to boycott irresponsible corporations and reward responsible ones. 
34 That is, taking both financial and environmental/social factors when making investment decisions and avoiding 
investment in socially irresponsible firms. 
35 See, e.g., Colin Boyd, The Nestlé Infant Formula Controversy and a Strange Web of Subsequent Business 
Scandals, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 283, 283–89 (2012); Deborah Doane, The Myth of CSR: The Problem with Assuming 
that Companies Can Do Well While Also Doing Good Is That Markets Don’t Really Work That Way, STAN. 
SOCIAL INNOVATION REV. 23, 23–29 (2005). 
36 See Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 413. 
37 Id. 
38 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying texts. 
39 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 418. 
activities nor provide a regulatory environment that imposes on firms’ positive obligations 
towards their stakeholders — i.e., companies are legitimately allowed to prioritize shareholder 
interest40 — it is the market and societal force that determines the promotion and development 
of CSR,41 which is largely voluntary and explicit.  
 
IV. SHAPING CSR IN CHINA 
A. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CSR 
Different political systems (including power of state), financial systems (including 
main source for corporations), education and labor systems, cultural systems and organization 
of market processes, among many other factors, all materially affect the CSR systems.42 
Take the U.S., which features a long history of typical explicit CSR system, as an 
example. Its power of state is comparatively weak;43 central financial source for corporations 
is the stock market which, in turn, leads to more dispersed shareholdings and higher demand 
for transparence and accountability; individualism dominates, with individuals’ stronger ethic 
of “giving back.”44 Thus, despite weak social welfare provision under the existing institutions, 
corporations are under pressure from various corporate stakeholders to engage in CSR to 
address social problems.45 In contrast, in Continental Europe, which features an implicit CSR 
system, the states are more powerful and proactive in engaging economic and social activities; 
corporations tend to be embedded in a network of a few large investors and banks are a more 
important financial source for corporations; collectivism dominates, with a trend to rely more 
on representative organizations such as states, political parties, unions or churches.46 
In the Chinese context, the state has even greater power. Both before and after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, governments kept concentrated 
economic power in the hands of the state by nationalizing a majority of industrial and financial 
enterprises.47 Despite the fast growth of private sectors in China, the government still plays a 
proactive and dominant role in economic and social domains.48 Second, the central financial 
source for China’s domestic corporations is still the banking sector dominated by large state-
owned banks.49 For example, according to the International Monetary Fund, banks have been 
dominating the Chinese financial system, providing the private sector with credit that amounts 
to approximately 155.8% of Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) in 2017, while the figure in the 
U.S. is only 52% during the same period.50 Last, but not least, collectivism is enshrined in 
China where collective interests are prioritized. For example, collective ownership and 
 
40  It is even argued that any corporate behavior that is inconsistent with shareholder primacy would subsequently 
be considered as corporate deviance. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 2 (Princeton University Press 2008).  
41 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 407–409. 
42 Id.  
43 The power of state can be understood as the capacity of the state to be engaged in economic and social activities 
and whether the state is active or not. See, e.g., ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER ET AL., COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY: 
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHOICE IN AMERICA, EUROPE, AND JAPAN (St. Martin’s Press 1990). 
44 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 408. 
45  See, e.g., Timothy M. Devinney et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: 
Comparative Perspectives, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 413, 414 (2013). 
46 Matten & Moon, supra note 2, at 408. 
47 Min Yan, Evolution of the Corporation and the Shareholders’ Role in China, 26 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 355, 
358 (2015). 
48 Juelin Yin & Yuli Zhang, Institutional Dynamics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in an Emerging 
Country Context: Evidence from China, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS 301, 313 (2012). 
49 Franklin Allen et al., An Overview of China’s Financial System, 9 ANNUAL REV. OF FIN. ECON. 191, 191–231 
(2017). 
50 Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP) – China, United States, Germany, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.AST.PRVT.G 
D.ZS?locations=CN-US-DE (last visited May16, 2020).  
cooperative economy in rural areas are highlighted in articles 6 and 8 of the Constitution of 
People’s Republic of China.51 Together with the omnipresent state intervention, the general 
public heavily relies on the state and expects it to solve substantially all social problems.   
As summarized in Table 1 below, the Chinese institutional environment is closer to 
Germany. Moreover, the key structural features of corporations in China—including 
concentrated ownership structure and comparatively lower managerial discretion—are also 
closer to the German model with large amount of direct ownership through networks of banks 
and other financial institutions. This contrasts with the market-based forms of contract-based 
ownership with a higher degree of managerial discretion in the U.S. 
 
Table 1  
The U.S. Continental Europe China 
Political 
system 
Power of the state is 
weak. 
Power of the state is 
greater: more engaged 
in economic and social 
activities, e.g. health 
and pension. 
Even greater state 
power: fully engaged 
in economic and social 
activities. 
Financial 
system 
Stock market is the 
central financial source 
for corporations. 
Shareholdings are more 
dispersed, where higher 
degree of transparence 
and accountability is 
needed. 
Corporations tend to be 
embedded in a network 
of a small number of 
large investors, and 
banks play a major 
role. 
A fast-growing stock 
market, but is still 
dominated by a 
banking sector with 
large state-owned 
banks. 
Cultural 
system  
Individualism: 
individual’s stronger 
ethic of “giving back.” 
Collectivism: more 
reliant on 
representative 
organizations (e.g. 
state, political party, 
union or church). 
Collectivism: rely on 
the state to a large 
extent. 
 
 
B. GOVERNMENTAL/REGULATORY FORCE FOR CSR 
Following the argument in the previous section, when a nation’s CSR system can be 
classified as implicit and mandatory, the governmental and regulatory force must be the 
dominant driver for CSR. In China, when CSR began to emerge, it was regarded as a solution 
by governments to regulate corporations that “refuse to sign their workers up to social 
insurance projects, fail to protect workers from injury and exploit employees by not signing 
proper labour contracts, [force people to] work over time … delay wage payments and use 
fraudulent accounting.”52 China is the first nation to explicitly stipulate mandatory CSR in their 
statutes.53  Article 5 of Chinese Company Law 2005 (“Company Law”) stipulates: “in its 
 
51  XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] ( 宪 法 ), arts. 6, 8 (China), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm. 
52 Todd Miller, A Chinese Definition of CSR Ethical Corporation, ETHICAL CORP. 34, 34–35 (2005). 
53 Colin Hawes, Interpreting the PRC Company Law Through the Lens of Chinese Political and Corporate 
Culture, 30 UNIV. OF NEW S. WALES L.J. 813, 820 (2007). 
operational activities, a company shall . . . assume social responsibilities.”54 This provision 
along with others under the first chapter of the Company Law entitled General Provision have 
significant influence on the corporate governance and management of corporations in China 
due to the political and corporate culture.55 
The Company Law also provides a wider protection for non-shareholding stakeholders. 
For example, article 17 specifies employee protection by stating that the corporation shall 
protect the lawful rights and interests of its employees, conclude employment contracts with 
employees, buy social insurance and strengthen labor protection so as to realize safe 
production.56 This is followed by article 18, providing the foundation for labor union activity 
in corporations in order to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the employees with 
respect to remuneration, working hours, welfare, insurance, operational safety and health of 
employees among other. 57  Article 18 further requires corporations to provide necessary 
conditions for its labor union to carry out activities.58 It requires that the labor union shall, on 
behalf of the employees, conclude the collective contract with the corporation with respect to 
the foregoing issues. 59  When facing restructuring or other important issue in relation to 
business operations, the corporation is mandatorily required to solicit opinions from its labor 
union, or employees through other channels,60 which makes employees’ opinions of great 
significance prior to making certain important corporate decisions. 
Taking a cue from the German dual-board structure and co-determination, the Company 
Law similarly requires employee representatives to sit on the supervisory board.61 The ratio of 
employee representatives cannot be lower than one third and individual corporations could, of 
course, set a higher ratio in its articles of association.62 While there are many problems with 
the current supervisory board system in terms of the effectiveness of monitoring the 
management board,63 it at least provides a good chance for the supervisory board and its 
employee representatives to represent wider interests. Moreover, when a corporation is 
established by two or more state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) or other state-owned investors 
or is wholly state-owned, the board of directors shall be comprised of employee representatives 
who are required to be elected through the employees’ representative congress, or in other ways 
according to articles 45 and 68 of the said law.64 
Apart from these measures, the regulatory effort is also reflected in legislations and 
rules that define the minimum standards of corporate behavior. For example, the newly 
amended environmental protection law obligates corporations to implement environmental 
protection measures to prevent and reduce environmental pollution and ecological disruption 
and provides severe sanctions for non-compliance.65  
 
54 Gongsi Fa (公司法) [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 
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Government can also use departmental regulations and polices to drive CSR 
development. For example, since 2008, all yang qi (centrally controlled corporations), 
normally the largest and most important corporations controlled by the central government in 
China, are required to protect the interests of employees and promote a balance between 
economic returns, social returns and employee interests.66 These firms are also required to 
regularly release CSR reports.67 In the same year, the Measures of Environmental Information 
Disclosures (for trial implementation) issued by the former State Environmental Protection 
Administration68 came into effect, providing detailed requirements on both mandatory and 
voluntary environmental information disclosure for different types of firms.69 Similarly, CSR 
Guidelines issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
the State Council (“SASAC”) require SOEs to take responsibility for all stakeholders and the 
environment, and ultimately to harmonize the enterprise with social and environmental 
development.70 
The political desire behind government’s effort to promote CSR is not hard to identify. 
“Building Harmonious Society” and “Pursuing Scientific Development” are perhaps the best 
reflection of such political will to develop CSR in China. Both concepts were proposed by 
President Hu Jintao, the then General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party and Head of State, 
in 2003 and 2004 respectively, and perceived as the dominant socio-economic mission for the 
central government and the central policy guidelines for sustainable development in China.71 
For instance, following the concepts of “Building Harmonious Society” and “Pursuing 
Scientific Development,” the regional government in Shandong province established an 
indexing system and a CSR association that includes over 4,000 enterprises; and Zhejiang 
province created China’s first CSR evaluation system for private enterprises.72 The political 
will set energy saving, emission reduction, and labor rights protection as national strategies 
which had, in turn, significantly promoted individual firms’ CSR policies and activities.73 CSR 
has since been regarded as an organic part of the concept of scientific development that would 
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lead to the construction of harmonious society. 74  Just as an Assistant Minister from the 
Ministry of Commerce claimed in the inaugural CSR China Forum, the advancement of CSR 
in China is “a concrete action taken by Chinese companies to implement the political aspiration 
of the new Communist Party collective leadership.”75 
Another important aspect of the institutional environment in China is the integrated 
Communist Party’s leadership in corporate governance. The establishment of a “Party 
organization” or a “Party committee” in the corporation to carry out activities of the Chinese 
Communist Party is enshrined in law.76 The law requires corporations to provide necessary 
conditions for the Party organization’s activities.77 By the end of 2017, “Party organizations” 
had been established in 185,000 public enterprises and 1.877 million non-public enterprises, 
accounting for 91.2% of total public enterprises and 73.1% of total non-public enterprises.78 In 
recent years, increasingly more Chinese listed companies have amended their articles of 
association to incorporate Party organizations aiming to strengthen and clarify the leadership 
of Party organizations, especially after the 19th National Party Congress in 2017.79 
In addition to participating in corporate governance, Party organizations are also 
required to report to the Communist Party.80  Meanwhile, it should also be borne in mind that 
“upholding the leadership by the Chinese Communist Party” is one of the “Four Basic 
Principles” brought forward by the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.81 The chairman of the 
board, or sometimes the general manager, acting as the key person would often be the secretary 
of the Party of the corporation, especially where the state has a large stake.82 Not surprisingly, 
directors, if they are Party members, could be potentially required to follow the Party’s policies 
and guidelines,83 which are of course much broader than the narrow focus on shareholders’ 
economic interests.  
Empirical studies have also confirmed the governmental/regulatory force behind the 
unique understandings and perceptions of CSR in China. Based on a survey on 1268 CEOs of 
business owners of industrial firms across China by the World Bank and Peking University in 
2006, Xu and Yang highlighted some unique CSR dimensions, including promoting 
national/local economic development, emphasize technology and innovation, paying taxes, 
reemploying laid-off employees, providing jobs for the disabled, easing national employment 
pressure, and ensuring social stability, which reflect either government policies or regulatory 
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requirements. 84  A more recent empirical study also reflected that complying with 
governmental policies/requirements and persevering corporate image/reputation are the top 
two motivations behind Chinese corporations getting involved in CSR and reporting CSR.85 
These are all consistent with the government-driven CSR in China as analyzed above.  
 
C. MARKET AND SOCIETAL FORCE FOR CSR — THE BUSINESS CASE 
Apart from the dominant governmental/regulatory factor, another key driver for CSR 
in China is the market and societal force. When the modern concepts of CSR first appeared in 
China in mid-1990s, global market demands and socialization by international and non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) also prompted the passive acceptance of CSR.86 Many 
Chinese exporting firms had experienced CSR assessments by their international buyer as a 
precondition. 87  Improving CSR performance is therefore seen as a license to enter the 
international market. Corporations, especially export-oriented ones, aiming at overseas 
markets cannot afford to ignore the increasing CSR concern. In order to better understand and 
anticipate social expectations in Western markets and thereby compete globally, Chinese 
corporations have to either passively or proactively accept the standards, codes of conducts 
relating to CSR issues, such as labor rights and environmental performance.  
With higher global standards and increasing environmental pressures, economic 
activities are expected to support the protection of environment. A visible sign of this demand 
is green finance, i.e., the financial services provided to project investment and financing in the 
fields of environmental protection, energy conservation, clean energy, green transport, green 
architectures and the like.88  In China, green finance is also becoming increasingly more 
important. For example, China’s green bond market 89  grew steadily in recent years. 90 
According to the China Green Bond Market Report 2018, the total amount of green bonds 
issued in China has reached $42.8bn, representing a 12% increase year-on-year.91 Although 
green finance is narrower than socially responsible investment (“SRI”) as it mainly focuses on 
environmental issues,92 the fast-growing green bond market undoubtedly provides a similar 
incentive for corporations to be at least more environmentally conscientious and encourage 
investee corporations to more explicitly claim environmental responsibility. Further, there has 
also been a strong focus on the need for domestic investment managers to take account of 
environment, society and governance factors in their investment process.93 Accordingly, if the 
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market and societal force becomes a main driver for corporations’ more responsible behavior, 
then an explicit CSR system may be established, which may imply a reduced need for a strictly 
regulated regime. 
There is also a trend towards ethical consumerism in China domestically. Consumers 
have become increasingly aware of CSR information, in particular environmental issues, and 
changed purchase behaviors accordingly. Pursuant to Ali Research and Alibaba Foundation’s 
Report on China’s Green Consumers 2016, the number of green consumers online had reached 
65 million, increasing by 14 times over the previous four years at the end of 2015.94 Green 
products are emerging as a new growth sector in the retail industry. Thus, in addition to capital 
markets, consumer markets may also drive corporations towards more explicit CSR.  
In short, the market/societal force would help corporations to justify CSR from its 
instrumental function to increase corporate profits and shareholder value, i.e., to provide them 
the so-called business case. 
 
V. FROM IMPLICIT TO EXPLICIT CSR IN CHINA? 
Both the institutional environment and the dominant role of governmental/regulatory 
force, as discussed so far, reflect the implicit mandatory CSR system in China. There is, 
however, a potential challenge against such implicit CSR development in China, because a 
mature and comprehensive system for protecting stakeholders is not yet established. Although 
there is a growing body of legal institutions for protecting various societal interests, the current 
institutional focus in China is still on minority shareholder protection.95 Due in part to unique 
historical factors, when the corporate system was restored after the official acknowledgement 
of the socialist market economy status and the acknowledgement of individual property rights, 
it triggered a huge demand for emphasizing shareholder rights and their protection. 96  In 
particular, shareholder interest is a relatively new concept in China, and that is exactly why 
academics argued that shareholders should be entitled to more rights and protection in order to 
encourage them to exercise their rights.97 The newly created China Securities Investor Service 
Center at the end of 2014 for increased minority investor protection is another good example 
of the current institutional priority.98 As a result, there might be conflict between pursuing 
shareholder interests and societal interests.99 
Meanwhile, opportunities do exist for a rise of corporation’s explicit and voluntary CSR 
activities in China. The increasing exposure to capital markets make both socially responsible 
investment and domestic green finance form an important force for corporations to incorporate 
CSR policy and activities. One good example is that Chinese listed companies are increasingly 
keen to signal their social and environmental responsibility to their investors.100 The pressure 
from both international and domestic consumers on social and environmental perspectives 
together with the far-reaching and decentralized modern media also drive corporations to more 
explicitly engage in CSR activities. Put differently, the increased social expectation of 
businesses and businesses’ own legitimacy concern caused by such market and societal force 
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would inevitably push corporations towards more explicit CSR. Especially when the scale and 
scope of corporations’ explicit voluntary CSR activities are on the rise while implicit 
mandatory CSR rules are shrinking worldwide,101 the crucial question here is will implicit 
practice of business responsibility transform into explicit CSR activities in China? 
 
A. ISOMORPHIC PRESSURE: THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
The case of Germany’s convergence to explicit voluntary CSR from implicit mandatory 
CSR may help us to better understand the question of whether China’s CSR system would shift 
from implicit to explicit and may help us to foresee the future CSR development in China. 
To begin, as discussed above, Germany had a typical implicit CSR system at least 
before the end of last century.102 Its institutional and regulatory environment left corporations 
little room to practice voluntary CSR outside mandatory issues. However, with the erosion of 
organized capitalism in Germany since the mid-1980s and 1990s, the power of trade unions 
and the binding nature of collective agreements have deteriorated and inter-corporation 
networks dissolved.103 First, law broke the tradition of attempting to combine shareholders’ 
interests with stakeholders’ interests. For example, KonTraG 1998 (Corporate Sector 
Supervision and Transparency Act) deliberately lacked any reference to the stakeholders’ view 
of the corporation in order to put the shareholders’ value front and center.104 Similarly, in 
contrast to the earlier Aktiengesetz (German Stock Corporation Law) discussed above,105 
stakeholders’ view is no longer mentioned in Aktiengesetz 2009106 or Aktiengesetz 2016.107 
Corporations have shifted a large part of their added value from the public to private 
shareholders. 108  Additionally, financial markets with short-term horizons became more 
common and normalized.109 Meanwhile, the role of banks as the financial source has become 
less important in Germany. In 2001, for example, domestic credit to private sector by banks 
amounting to 112% of GDP in Germany compared with 49.9% in the U.S.110 But the figure in 
2017 shrank to 77.2% in Germany, compared to 52% in the U.S., according to the World Bank 
data.111  
In a nutshell, we can find out that the shift from implicit to explicit CSR is associated 
with the weakening of the governmental/regulatory force, which then provided room for the 
fast growth of the market/societal force in driving CSR. This means that if the governmental 
force and institutions that drive firms to engage with society become weaker, then there is a 
good chance that the implicit CSR in China will transform to explicit CSR. Otherwise, this 
transformation is unlikely. 
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B. THE TRADITION AND CURRENT MOMENTUM 
The path dependency theory has taught us that “today’s road depends on what path was 
taken before” due to factors such as adaptive costs, complementarities, and network 
externalities among others.112 In other words, the current state of a system is the result of its 
initial conditions, and tradition or historical preference is a good reference for the future.113  
Similar to the industrial paternalism present during the 19th century industrialization—
where firms tended to provide housing, education and recreational facilities for workers—there 
is also a tradition for firms in China to take a paternalistic role regarding their employees.114 
This had caused firms, especially state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), to supply social security 
to both employees and their families.115 Interestingly, firms in China had been called as “unit” 
or “work unit” which implies that enterprise is treated as an integrated unit of society.116 It was 
not uncommon in the 1970s or 1980s for an enterprise to have its own hospital, schools and so 
forth.117 Although not as many corporations run affiliated hospitals or schools for employees 
and their families nowadays, the tradition to call a company “unit” has not materially 
changed.118 This implies that the perception of paternalism still exists to some extent and may 
continue to advance implicit CSR. 
Also noteworthy is that the SOEs in the past functioned not materially differently from 
government affiliates: their almost sole objective was to complete tasks assigned by the state. 
Under the planned economy system, everything from resource allocation to operation, 
production and distribution was centrally planned by the state in advance.119 It is not surprising 
to see the traditional SOEs’ implicit societal responsibility stem from political ideology. It 
would also be understandably clear that economic interests of the corporation had never been 
a priority when the government played a dominant role in corporate operation. So modern 
corporations that have been converted from traditional SOEs in China are less concerned about 
the so-called competitive advantage or market pressure like their counterparts in the West. 
Instead, they normally have commitments to labor or a particular stakeholder group in 
accordance with state preference.120  
The governmental/regulatory force has an impact on the market/societal force in 
driving CSR as well. Take Chinese green finance as an example. Although it is the 
investors/creditors who press corporations to engage in more explicit environmentally 
responsible behaviors (hence a market/societal force), it is not difficult to observe the 
governments’ shadow behind these initiatives. Apart from the fact that stated-owned banks still 
dominate the central financial sources for corporations, green finance is included in the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) by the central government.121 And, in August 2016, the 
People’s Bank of China, along with other governmental departments such as the Ministry of 
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Finance, jointly issued Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System.122 In the 
Guidelines, things such as disclosure of environmental information, disclosure standards of 
green bond issuance, third-party assessment and rating standards, and the supervision and 
coordination of green finance are emphasized.123 As a result, the status quo of government-
driven CSR can hardly be shaken. 
 
C. WEAK BUSINESS CASE ARGUMENT 
Pressures from international buyers, green finance, domestic ethical consumerism and 
the like discussed above indicate the strengthening of market/societal force, namely a business 
case to do CSR in China. Perhaps partially in  response to Milton Friedman, who forcefully 
argued that the only responsibility of the firm is to use its resources and engage in activities to 
maximize its profits,124 mainstreaming explicit voluntary CSR meant “aggressively pursuing 
viable business opportunities with a CSR dimension.”125 Emphasis on contemporary CSR 
research in recent decades is disproportionately placed on the correlation between CSR and 
corporate financial performance, i.e., to establish the business justification and rationale for 
CSR.126 In Vogel’s words, the “new world of CSR” is “doing good to do well.”127 Engaging in 
CSR becomes a corporate strategy to reinforce corporate competitive advantage from 
traditional harm mitigation.128 
Based on Zadek’s four general types of business case for CSR,129 Kurucz, Colbert and 
Wheeler had argued engaging in CSR activities will (1) reduce a firm’s costs and risks; (2) gain 
competitive advantage in the context of a differentiation strategy; (3) strengthen a firm’s 
legitimacy and reputation; (4) create a win-win outcome by connecting stakeholder interests.130 
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, in addition to the governmental and regulatory 
requirement, CSR has been employed by Chinese corporations to enter into international 
markets. 131  We can see that meeting green investors’ preferences, attracting excellent 
employees at lower costs, improving risk management,132 improving corporate image, and 
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strengthening their brand ultimately improve corporate economic benefits. These all fit for the 
business case argument and reflect market/social force as the driver. 
It is argued that managers from developed countries have an overall tendency to 
interpret CSR in a manner consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 133  Many 
corporate managers justify their decisions to do CSR by using “business case” discourse.134 
CSR in China is also thought to be secondary to shareholders’ wealth maximization. For 
example, the concept of CSR is defined by the Chinese Institute of Labor and Social Security 
as the responsibility to take stakeholders’ benefits into consideration when pursue maximum 
profit for shareholders.135 Consequently, relying on a business case to justify the do-good 
behavior would inevitably lead to the confusion between means and end, particularly when the 
business case weakens or disappears. Like the so-called triple bottom line of economic, social, 
and environmental performance,136 the business case argument appeals to enlightened self-
interest and emphasizes long-term economic performance by avoiding short-term behavior that 
is socially detrimental or environmentally wasteful. It works best for CSR issues that coincide 
with corporation’s economic interests. But the reality is that for many other issues there will 
be no direct economic rewards. When conflicts arise between interests of shareholders and 
non-shareholders, directors are only required to address shareholders’ interests under such 
logic and take actions to produce the highest possible returns for them, even at the expense of 
non-shareholders groups.  
In addition to the inherent flaw of the business case argument as analyzed above, the 
market/societal force in China is not as strong as it is in the West. Although the stock markets 
have grown quickly since the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges at 
the end of 1990, and the market capitalization of listed domestic corporations in China is about 
$8.7 trillion as of 2017 (second only to the U.S.),137 banks, especially state controlled ones, 
remain the most important financial source for Chinese corporations.138 Besides, the market 
force mainly focuses on environment due to current, severe environmental problems, which 
means other aspects of CSR cannot be appropriately covered and thereby insufficiently valued 
by market actors. It implies issues other than environmental problems may not attract investors 
or consumers’ due attention. Also, corporations with monopolistic or oligopolistic power, such 
as many SOEs, are to some extent immune from market pressure and have less concern about 
the legitimacy issues. Considering China’s large population and massive domestic consumer 
market, it is not surprising to see that ethical consideration may easily be outweighed by 
conventional product attributes such as quality, value for money, and service especially in rural 
areas. Meanwhile, the societal force to drive CSR is also unintentionally limited on the 
assumption that the growth of civil society is materially curtailed by the government. For 
instance, NGOs are prohibited from setting up regional offices or raising funds in order to 
prevent them from growing too big or too powerful; and if there is already an NGO doing 
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similar work in the same administrative area, then new NGOs will not be allowed to form.139  
In short, due to weak market/societal force, there is so far a lack of imperatives for 
corporations in China to be explicitly socially responsible as there are in the U.S.140 Solely 
relying on corporations’ explicit voluntary CSR activities is not enough or even dangerous, 
especially when the market/societal force is not “strong.” On the other side, the implicit 
mandatory CSR could help to cover the gap by providing the institutional environment for 
corporations to expend resources for socially beneficial purposes without profit motive.  
 
VI. IMPLICIT CSR WITH AN EXPLICIT ELEMENT  
This paper is in line with new institutional theories and highlights the non-voluntary 
aspect of CSR.141 Besides mandatory CSR, much of the corporate attention to CSR has never 
been entirely voluntary.142 Most times, it is just to respond to social pressures, which can be 
termed as corporate social responsiveness.143 A recent example in the U.K. is that Pret A 
Manger promised to label all ingredients that include allergens on its freshly made products 
following the death of a 15-year-old girl who had an allergic reaction after eating a Pret 
sandwich, despite the fact that the U.K. food labelling laws allow some foods to be sold without 
individual labels denoting which allergens they contain.144 One of the main advantages of 
corporate social responsiveness is to take the “moral heat” off corporations and focus more on 
their tangible activities as a socially responsive entity.145  
Implicit CSR could also take the “moral heat” off and avoid the difficult question of 
whether corporations should assume social responsibility or respond to social pressures, and 
shift focus to the question of how to respond in fruitful, humane, and practical ways. Doing 
CSR can then be viewed as some form of rationalization for corporations to maintain the 
appearance of compliance or legitimacy in their institutional environments by responding to 
the governmental/regulatory force. 
Although both governmental/regulatory force and market/societal force for CSR are 
increasing in China, the current momentum along with comparatively weak market/societal 
force determine the governmental/regulatory force should remain as the dominant drive for 
CSR and a more mandatory CSR framework with clear legal obligations can be expected in 
the future. Put differently, mandatory rules and regulations have played a large role in shaping 
CSR in China, and they will continue to play a vital role in advancing CSR. It is then reasonable 
to foresee, first of all, more regulations and rules defining the minimum standards of corporate 
behavior. For example, a more comprehensive and stricter environmental protection law, anti-
corruption law and the like can be expected. Secondly, it is also possible for the Chinese 
 
139 Tan-Mullins & Hofman, supra note 86, at 9. 
140 Even in the West, it is questionable that the market/societal force is able to make a fundamental change. 
Companies selling cigarettes or providing gambling services have enjoyed higher returns than the stock market 
indices. For example, the S&P 500 Tobacco index has outperformed the S&P by more than 1,000% over the last 
28 years, DEUTSCHE ASSET MANAGEMENT, TOBACCO’S INVESTMENT RETURNS AND SOCIETAL COSTS 
(September 2017), https://www.rreefpropertytrust.com/globalassets/microsites/esg/esg-report-issue-
2_tobacco.pdf.  
141 That is to say, the company as an economic organization is influenced by social institutions, and corporate 
behavior is shaped by institutional contexts. In other words, instrumental and business case rationale is not 
adequate in justifying all social engagement by companies. 
142 See, e.g., Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Thorough Law and For Law, 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2009/03, 19 (2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369305P30. 
143 William C. Frederick, From CSR1 to CSR2: The Maturing of Business-and-Society Thought, 33 BUS. & SOC’Y 
150, 154 (1994). 
144 See, e.g., Pret A Manger to Label Products After Allergy Death, BBC (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-45731201. 
145 Frederick, supra note 143, at 158–59. 
government to go further and follow section 135 of the Indian Companies Act 2013146 to 
require large corporations to mandatorily contribute a fraction of corporate profits to a range 
of recognized CSR activities. Non-compliance without a justifiable explanation will lead to 
fines or imprisonment for corporations and/or responsible corporate officers. Last, but not least, 
a more indirect touch from the government would be to mandate CSR disclosure that covers 
corporations’ CSR policies, and how the corporations translate their CSR policies into actions. 
In order to overcome the so-called “green-washing” problem,147 sufficiently detailed, precise 
and comprehensive information can be requested to avoid the selective reporting under such a 
disclosure scheme.148 
Regulations and laws nevertheless have limits; they are not always as effective in 
regulating businesses as one may hope. Take tax avoidance for example. While one can evade 
taxes by illegal methods such as not disclosing assets, there are lawful ways to avoid taxes or 
gain tax advantages by using artificial transactions. These methods may go against the spirit of 
the law but do not necessarily break the letter of the law. For instance, global firms such as 
Starbucks, Google and Amazon were doing legal things when they paid little or even no 
corporate tax to the U.K. Treasury while their turnovers exceed hundreds of million pounds.149 
Furthermore, construction of an institutional and regulatory environment normally lags behind 
social development, including both rapidly developing technology and evolving social 
norms.150 Mandatory rules are fundamentally reactive and will only be adopted to “regulate 
behavior that has offended changing societal expectations to such an extent that political forces 
mobilize to enact new legally binding standards.”151 
Thus, although it is vital to provide more obligations in order to set a minimum standard 
and level the playing field for a fair competitive environment in the Chinese context, the 
importance of discretion should not be overlooked. In other words, the market/societal force 
should also be effectively exploited to fill the gap left by governmental/regulatory force in 
driving CSR. In fact, governmental/regulatory force does not restrict the role of governments 
in mandating CSR, i.e., stipulating minimum standards for corporate behavior within the legal 
framework. According to Fox, Ward and Howard, apart from mandate, other key roles of 
government in advancing CSR include facilitation, partnership and endorsement. 152 
Specifically, governments could incentivize corporations to engage with a CSR agenda or drive 
social and environmental improvements by facilitation, such as by providing funding for 
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research, leading campaigns, information collation and dissemination, training, and awareness 
raising. Governments could also act as participants, conveners, or facilitators and bring 
complementary skills and inputs from both public and private sectors through strategic 
partnerships. The lightest touch is the so-called endorsement. Governments could render 
political support and public sector endorsement of the concept of CSR and CSR-related 
initiatives through various methods such as authoritative guidance, training schemes, and 
awards.153 
Governments’ facilitation, partnership, endorsement other than mandate would 
definitely leave more rooms for individual corporations to exercise their discretion in doing 
CSR. Discretionary activities beyond governmental regulatory requirements, but endorsed and 
encouraged by governments, will potentially lead to a hybrid of explicit and implicit CSR 
activities. Thus, even though implicit CSR and explicit CSR are two traditionally incompatible 
systems, the unique situation in China makes implicit CSR co-exist with explicit CSR 
activities. And it is possible for corporations to engage in explicit voluntary CSR activities 
while simultaneously meeting governmental/regulatory requirements. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the government in China, the determined political will to fully engage in social and 
economic activities including continually shaping CSR by regulations and policies mean 
implicit CSR activities would remain the norm. But when the government is increasingly 
looking to businesses for help in addressing policy shortcomings,154 it can employ CSR to 
encourage corporations to contribute to the national economic, social and environmental 
agendas. In doing so, the government should play some roles other than mandating in 
promoting CSR in China, and thereby leave more rooms for corporate discretionary CSR 
activities. CSR, in the form of non-mandatory regulation, can have “a role to play in 
complementing law, by providing wider ethical standards and forces of social accountability, 
and by not only making demands on business beyond those of formal law, but making formal 
law itself more effective.”155  At the very least, playing a non-mandating role would not 
contradict the implicit mandatory system because mandatory rules can always be used as last 
resort when encouragement or recommendations on voluntary CSR does not succeed. 
For businesses, the rising market/societal force in China as analyzed above certainly 
provides good opportunities or rationales for corporations to claim more explicit CSR activities 
either passively or proactively. When corporations go beyond legal requirements and endeavor 
to meet society’s expectations of conventional corporate behavior and improve the wellbeing 
of relevant stakeholders through discretionary business practices, they will inevitably engage 
with their stakeholders. In terms of the stakeholder engagement in China, government is 
thought by businesses as the most important stakeholder, who sits at the top of the CSR 
pyramid. 156  Therefore, even when corporations engage in explicit CSR activities, the 
governmental factor remains a priority. On the other side, if businesses in China want to take 
more initiatives and ward off further, and potentially tighter, government regulation of CSR, 
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the only possibility is to engage in explicit CSR activities to meet their social responsibilities 
voluntarily and convince the government that there is no need to use governmental/regulatory 
force to drive CSR any further. Although it is very difficult, if not unrealistic, due to the 
compliance-oriented culture and the inadequacy of the business case in China, this is perhaps 
their only chance to engage in CSR more strategically rather than through mere compliance in 
the future. 
 
